"This volume brilliantly provides direction for the re-foundation of the history of education. It is an essential volume for opening up new perspectives and insights on a field in need of critical inquiry that avoids the presence and limits of the long tradition of historicism. The collection is unique in locating the history of education through the history of history, cultural history, and the sociology of knowledge and science, among other fields."

—Miguel A. Pereyra, Professor, Comparative Education, University of Granada, Spain

"In urging readers to ‘revision’ the history of education, this stimulating collection of essays makes a convincing plea for thinking deeply about the styles of reason that underlie existing paradigms. Although the field of American history of education is the ostensible target of this critical call for historicizing, the transnational and comparative dialogue established between the authors will speak to cultural historians and educational researchers around the world. This is the perfect book to generate lively discussion among students and scholars interested in questioning the relationship between historical questions, methods, and the materiality of the archive."

—Rebecca Rogers, Professor, History of Education, Université Paris Descartes, France

Drawing on a wide variety of traditions and methods in historical studies from the humanities and social sciences both, this volume considers how historians from a wide variety of countries create the study of the history of education. It poses ways of thinking about the questions, methods, and knowledge of historical studies in the formation of schooling that go beyond those typically found in American studies of the history of education.

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in understanding what constitutes education practices and processes; and (c) the significance of examining the social, cultural, and political principles through which schooling is governed and what is selected and organized as the “subjects” taught in schooling.

Second, the chapters challenge the commonsense understanding of the historical development of the school and the problem of educational change. It does this by engaging in a conversation that interrelates historical studies of education with social, cultural, and political theories of knowledge.

Third, interdisciplinary literatures are presented in a manner that can enable the reader to rethink the significance and implications of schooling in modern societies as well as the methods through which the historical understandings can be illuminated.

THOMAS S. POPEK WITZ
Madison, Wisconsin
November 19, 2012

Notes

1. In preparing the volume, there is also recognition that some of the challenges taken up about writing historiography are also being taken up, in part, through a few historians in the American history of education.

2. Again, this general statement is muted by the American historians who contributed to this volume. Noah Selby. His scholarship has been related to European history. He is a member of Paezapolica Historica Editorial Board, an editor of the journal *European Education*, and uses the archives through theoretically questioning the modes of interpretation brought to documents.

3. This observation comes through discussions with Miguel Perecyra, the University of Granada, Spain, who is studying the emergence of American history of education in the early nineteenth century and Miriam Wende, a contributor to this volume.

References


Chapter 1

Styles of Reason: Historicism, Historicizing, and the History of Education

THOMAS S. POPEK WITZ

This chapter examines two different historical styles of reason to talk about how the traces of the past are studied. In talking about history as styles of reason, it explores the principles that govern the forms of historical questions, its methods and meanings of the archive, and the modes of judgments in the narratives of history. Differences discussed as styles of reason are to explore how complex movements of thought and cultural practices produce ways in which judgments are made, conclusions drawn, and the fields of existence made manageable within the field of history.

The problem of thinking of historical work can be initially approached through the work of Marc Bloch (1964), a founder of the French *Annales* historical school. Bloch wrote that historians have only tracks left from the past; not the past! It is these tracks that provide traces from which history is written from the present; even when that history seeks to hermeneutically understand the past. The problem of thinking about what constitutes historiography is how, then, the traces are connected as ways of thinking about change.

I focus on two different historical styles of reason to talk about how the traces of the past are studied. One is historicism that I associate with the dominating style of reason in American educational history. While historicism has different variations such as in social and intellectual histories, my interest is on certain principles that order and classify the objects of history. A different style of reason, again with variations, I call historicizing. Its landscape, explored in this volume, is given expression as cultural history, genealogy, and
history of the present, among others (see, e.g., Popkewitz, Franklin, and Pereyra, eds. 2001).

In talking about history as styles of reason, I borrow from Hacking (1992) to explore the principles that govern the forms of historical questions, its methods and meaning of the archive, and the modes of judgments as the narratives of history. Differences discussed as styles of reason is to explore how complex movements of thought and cultural practices produce ways in which judgments are made, conclusions drawn, and the fields of existence made manageable within the field of history.

The volume is to engage the history of education in a conversation by its questions, methods, and knowledge. The introduction uses styles of reason as a way to engage in that conversation. First, historicism is discussed as embodying epistemological principles that order its narratives of the past. These principles relate to a particular notion of humanism in historicism. These principles insert the subject of history as the agent through which change is traced and the past known. The agents are, for example, children for whom educational psychologies provide the concepts that make visible their growth and development; the teacher whose paths are directed to professionalism from that of a craft; the institutional forms that evolve into the common school; and tracks that enable or limit the child from becoming the democratic citizen. The irony of this humanism, I argue, is that the authorial subject is taken as the origin of inquiry that places the actors as outside of history itself. The second section explores how the principles of this humanism work on the meaning given to the archive. The archive becomes the sacred space for “finding” the past through tracing the development and growth of the subject that history tells about. The third section focuses on a different style of reason that I call historicizing, a way of problematizing the ahistorical subject through asking about the conditions that make possible what is “seen” and acted on as the subject of schooling; for example, the notion of the artist as genius and inventive that is made possible as an object of reflection and action in schooling. Historicizing gives attention to the archive to consider the events that make possible the objects of social life rather than as the physical depository from which to trace the origins of the present. Where paradoxically historicism organizes the past to speak about the future, historicizing is a critical project to make fragile the seeming causality of the present.

The concern with styles of reason is neither to pose historicism and historicizing as a binary, nor is the argument normative about the Philosopher’s Stone of finding ultimate Truth. The distinctions are pragmatic and historical ways of “seeing” the field of history itself. Styles of reason are homologous to the Kuhn’s (1970) sense of paradigm in science. Kuhn’s historicizing of the practices of physics was to make visible the emergence of anomalies to the normal, dominant way of organizing scientific problems and think about change. The focus on the idea of styles of reason, discussed in the final section of this introduction and again in Fendler’s chapter, is to consider the limits of historicism, with historicizing as an alternative to the study of the past. The strategy of this introduction, then, is to make visible the principles of “reason” that circulate in historicism through a comparative mode of analysis, and place the chapters that follow within that context to suggest a possibility of a different order of questions and notions of methods than typically found in the American history of education.

Historicism: Style of Reason in the Search for the Past

While historicism in American history is generally debated, it is interesting to observe that the debate is absent from the history of education. My focus, however, will not be on the internal debates about historicism. However, important, my concern is different. It is with the style of reason that such debates about historicism presuppose. Four principles are discussed: (1) The particular humanism that inscribes the subjects of the child, teacher, and family as the origin of change; (2) the function of human consciousness as a particular “modern” way for thinking and ordering the representation of the actor as agent of change; (3) the examination of change as the tracing of moments, activities, and “thoughts” of the subject who is the actor of history; and (4) difference as the distinctions about the represented identities that form the historical subject. The principles form a grid that shape and fashion a style of “historical” reason to “see” and act on the archive as documents from which the past is made available as memory.

Humanism as the Insertion of the Subject as the Site/Agent of Change

The humanism that I speak about is given shape and fashioned by particular turns in the European and North American enlightenment. Previous notions of a transcendent entity, of a world fixed by one’s birth and of human beings as subjects of fate or Divine Will were
relocated to the “City of Man [sic],” to borrow from Becker (1932). In its varieties and nuances, human reason (wisdom and morality) and rationality (science) were given as central for understanding the present and producing progress. Visible in the Anglo-Saxon, French, and German-speaking enlightenments was the individual who could know and act in the world, which allowed for the discovery of an autonomous social order that was subject to its own laws (Witrock 2000, p. 42). The American Declaration of Rights and its Constitution are exemplars of this notion of universal reason. The human subject was given transcendental qualities that were “endowed” “with certain inalienable Rights” of “Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness.” The embodiment of these “inalienable rights” of humankind was placed in the citizen as a new kind of person entitled to “liberty and freedom.” This attitude toward human reason and rationality has a particular logic within historicism that emerges in the eighteenth century and later in the social and psychological sciences. The human actor is made as the a priori of historical studies. The social and individuals are given independent space and identity that seem autonomous but paradoxically interrelated in an ordered time. That ordering of time makes possible knowing about human development from which direction is given to what the future might be.

Intelectual and biographical histories follow these epistemological rules. The author is the agent of change whose history is traced through examining letters, diaries, books, and pamphlets. The “actor” as the transcendental social force is given in social histories as the structure whose materiality constrain and restrain individual freedom and liberty. History is to illuminate the structures (the hidden curriculums, for example) and, by knowing the structural rules, is to allow for interventions in order to enable human agency. Marx’s notions of class defined by labor and Weber’s notion of bureaucracy are two such examples of discussion of what constrains agency.

The transcription of the autonomous subject is central to the historicism of social reform, the welfare state, and the emergence of modern schooling in the nineteenth century. The narratives of history tell of their growth, development, conflict, and debates in the pursuits of liberty and freedom.

The humanist transcription of the agent as the subject of history is the daeva of historicism. It is argued that without the subject represented, the world is deterministic and without the possibilities of change. Oddly though, the historicist transcription of the actor and origin of change places the authorial subject of history as transcendental, outside of history and determined.
forms (the German kindergarten and Horace Mann’s references to the Prussian School) that are brought to the American shores but used in unique ways to form the common school. The “reason” of historicism is to order and calculate the social and intellectual processes that tell of the movements and activities that make possible the representations of the subjects of schools.

The inscription of this modern notion of consciousness is connected to a different radical innovation; that of thinking about human diversity in the ordering and classifying of what is known outside the given theological world and the given chain of being. Eisenstadt (2000) argues, for example, that “transcendental and mundane are bridged through giving human a conscious order and interest that can be exercised in social life [and] which also emphasized a growing recognition of the legitimacy of multiple individual and group goals and interests, and as a consequence allowed for multiple interpretations of the common good” (p. 5). Diversity entails thinking about difference that is not only about multiple interpretations but also of a hierarchy of values. Difference seems as merely technical. The origin of difference is from the given representations of identities, whether described as variations of civilizations along a continuum of advanced to primitive, or as comparative norms embodied in probability theories about populational differences wherein, for example, children are classified as representing “the achievement gaps.”

This self-reflection of modern consciousness can be thought of as “the homeless mind” (Berger, Berger, and Kellner 1974). “Homeless” in that it becomes possible to order and differentiate individual life and immediate experience in modernity through abstract terms that are both external and internal to what constitutes humanity. One such homeless term is the child as “learner,” a term that universalizes the qualities and characteristics of who the child is and should be, and which thus seems to supersede and transcend specific locations such as whether the child lives in wealth or poverty, or in Madison, Tokyo, or Cape Town! The abstract notions have no historical location, cultural specificity, or geographical boundaries; yet they are accessible through reason and rationality to order and give direction to daily life in a chronology of time about the future. The irony of the homeless mind is that the abstractions about kinds of people enter perception as principles that locate people in the particular givens of time and space.

The consciousness embodied in the homeless mind constitutes the self-reflective practice embodied in historicism. Consciousness is where knowledge generated about events and their processes have an autonomy and authority to prescribe processes of change. Knowledge is believed to provide contact with the world, the means by which we assure the security and stability of our place in it, and which guarantees pursuing our commitments toward the world. In speaking of the enlightenments, Cassirer (1932/1951) argues that “thought consists not only in analyzing and dissecting, but in actually bringing about that order of things which it conceives as necessary, so that by this act of fulfillment it may demonstrate its own reality and truth” (p. viii). Agency gives emphasis to the individual who thinks about and acts in a contextual variability that is made manageable through processes of analyzing and dissecting the discrete elements of life. Thought is the “conscious” process of logically ordering ideas as concepts that represent and control nature.

Consciousness as a particular ordering of self-reflection produces history as a chronology of the social and individual that are separate from nature but which the “mind” reflects on to order the present and to make judgment and action possible for change. The adolescent child is an example of this double quality of modern consciousness and its homeless mind. The adolescent is a transcendental subject given in the history of school and youth (Lesko and Talburt 2011). The notion of adolescence stands outside of history, and only its developments and variations in thought and research are traced to understand its variability, nuances of meaning, and effectiveness as an organizing principle that describes and differentiates how children and the school act and should act.

**Historicism, the Agent as the Representation of Agency, and Time as Development and Change**

In the discussion of consciousness, time was considered as a chronology that connects with the humanism of historicism. The representation of the subject has an independent space from which to record the movements from past to the present but with a continuing eye to the future. Whereas Greek time was cyclical, and to speak of the future was a power possessed only by the gods, and time in the medieval church was eternal and given meaning by God, history in the eighteenth century becomes an ordering of human affairs through regular, sequential, and irreversible movements of secular time. Modern history is no longer the search for a return or the transmission of God’s word. It is the calculations that place human life and its processes as its center to direct movement. This movement of time from the city of God to the secular city of humanism that inscribes the “modern” school pedagogy of the nineteenth century. The narratives of the
child are intertwined with those of the "nature" but that nature is separate from other historical paths. It is a nature that is solely about the human development of the history of nations, liberalization, and processes of democratization.

The key word in the new dimension of time is "process." Major social projects of the long nineteenth century are told through the ordering people-in-time. Legal, institutional, and historical history describes, for example, processes of the evolution of systems that coalesce into what becomes the modern welfare state. Society, the family, the child, and community are also placed in systems whose parts interrelate through processes whose past become the precursors and mediators of the present and, if properly understood, provide direction for organizing the future. The school is given new definitions along temporal dimensions of the interior changes in the child. Institutional classifications organize children by class "grades," with age indicators of children's physical, cognitive, and moral growth and development.

This making of time as signifying human processes is found in the epistemic qualities of the social and education sciences. The psychology of the child as a human science appears to chart processes, inventing distinctions of the mind as reflecting historical, social, and personal processes. Such distinctions as dimensions of time that administer change in the child are theories of children's learning, motivation, attitudes, and behavior (Danziger 1990, 1997). Time as the indicator of change is embodied in contemporary cognitive and learning sciences as processes of the working of the mind in the psychologies of the Swiss Piaget, the Russian Vygotsky, and the American Bruner.

It might seem as an oxymoron that the future becomes the element of modern historicism. In the nineteenth century, there occurs a wholesale awareness of change, the future, and history, with the Faustian notion of becoming rather than being. John Stuart Mills expresses, "The idea of comparing one's own age with former ages, or with our notion of those which are yet to come, had occurred to philosophers; but it never before was itself the dominant ideas of any age" (Ekstein 1985, p. 3). The projects of history focus on the regularities of time as the "process" that traces change in the representations given to the subject. The author as origin of thought and time as processes that describe change are industries that find expression in intellectual history and analytic philosophy. There are studies of, for example, the early and late Foucault, Dewey, Marx, Montessori, and Rousseau among others. The differentiation places thought as processes-in-time to constitute difference.

The past tied to the present and future also provides explanatory principles about society and individuality. The past is to identify the traditions that the present has overcome and to make a new future possible. Tradition is identified with dogma and ignorance. History and the social science as a modern project give justification for the absorption of the new and the future.

The modern project itself was the new, the actual, the contemporary. While remembering former modernities, we evoke their pastness to authenticate the newness of "what's new" and yet filter the contemporary through a gauze of the particles of the past. (Jaguaribe 2001, p. 333)

Dewey's pragmatism is a strategy to rid the present of the Old World's traditions that prevent progress and salvation. "The old culture is doomed for us because it was built upon an alliance of political and spiritual powers, an equilibrium of governing and leisure classes, which no longer exists" (Dewey 1929, pp. 501–502).

Two counter examples to this linear and chronological time are presented in the chapters on comparative history by Höracher, and Burke and Grosvenor. Höracher explores how the texts of Pestalozzi "travel" into different social and cultural spaces to create a relational and comparative field through which to consider schooling. Burke and Grosvenor focus on a nineteenth-century architecture to consider the intersection of different historical trajectories as a method to reading a biography.

The historicism assumption about humanism and its inscription of a transcendent agent of change described above are embodied in the practices of the social and education sciences (Popkewitz 2012). The human sciences embody the transcendent subject in an independent space in ordered time. The ordering discerns patterns of development and change as movements in time whose origin is defined by its actors and agents.

The Recognition of Difference and the Inscription of Divisions in the Historical Subject

Another element that gives intelligibility to historicism is the inscription of difference. In the eighteenth century, the history of human development was given a separate identity from nature, having its own lines of growth and differentiation. This comparative thought that focuses on "Man [sic]" is visible in the thinking of enlightenment
philosophers. They differentiate themselves from the past by arguing that the present is more advanced than its predecessors. This comparative thought about the past embodied a continuum of values from which advanced civilizations could be divided from “the savage” who did not possess the qualities of “civilized” reason. Darwin’s *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favored Races in the Struggle for Life* (1859) stresses notions of time-as-process that translate “things” of the natural biological order into things of comparable moral spaces of societies. The Social Darwinism of Sir Francis Galton stresses the inheritance of moral and mental traits, and the hope of better human breeding to ensure the prevalence of civilized and nobler qualities over those that are feeble. Difference gives importance to heartier races and the lioning of “moral” qualities through the perfection of natural selection (see, e.g., Glaude 2000).

The inscription of difference in historicism is embodied in the abistorical subject/agent. This can be illustrated in the construction of the adolescent spoken about earlier as a transcendent subject/agent in historicism. The study of that subject is a fixed object whose representations move in time to express differences and divisions. Inscribed are continuums of value and hierarchies about youth, for example, to differentiate and distinguish the characteristics of normalcy and pathology.

The double gestures of normalcy and pathology rest, at one layer, with the optimism of progress that travels simultaneously with fears of degeneration and decay. The comparative representation of difference in the subject of humanism is evident above in the distinctions of “levels” of civilizations and Social Darwinism. As Chamberlin and Gilman (1985) suggest, “hope was looked after by progress and seemed as the tenor of the times, but fear was contagious” (p. xiii). Elaborate symbols of corruption, degeneracy, and the fall of the republic are painted as ending the hope of progress, if, for example, the development of childhood is not controlled (Krug 1972).

Comparativeness is embodied in studies of American progressivism’s social sciences and psychology. Centering on political, economic, and social change of the city, attention is given to changes that made possible the common school, social mobility, and the ideological and social factors limiting progress. The histories of the American school tell of progressive education and its sciences as ideological battles that connect the self-development and growth of the urban home, the child, and community to standardized public virtues (Popkewitz 2012). The studies assume the representations of populations as different and focus on their possibilities for integration as told through their success in schools.

Yet the very categories that are to recognize difference inscribe difference. The histories tend to ignore how the distinctions that classify different populations as immigrants, racialized groups, and poverty produce divisions that inscribe moral notions of salvation and redemptions in “scientific” descriptions of normalcy and pathology (Popkewitz 2008; Trölller 2011). The processes are told as the history of the “urban” trilogy of the families, child, and community that comparatively recognize immigrant and racial populations for inclusion because they were different; that is, different in relation to unspoken norms about populations that are not “urban.”

The Archive as Theory and Materiality of Historicism

The archive in historicism functions through the particular kind of “self” that sees and acts on the documents of the past as the material, physical site of the work of history. The archive is to trace the processes of the transcendental subject through the practices in which the traces of the past are given an analytical and temporal order to show development and change. The grid of principles assembled in historicism becomes the imputed reality and the archive, as I discuss below, given romantic and magic qualities in the quest of the knowledge of history.

A bit of etymology first. The word archive is derived from the Greek *Archon* as the place where things begin and where power originates. The cult of the archive, as Steedman (2002, p. 4) calls it, is the fetishizing of it as the place of engagement with evidence that is collected together. This place serves materially as a foundational and paradigmatic activity of historians. It is the authority of beginnings and starting points of history. The archive is the *consecina* documentation of fragmentations of the past that are indexed and cataloged to be read, and narrativized as the details, for example, from which processes of the development of the American high school and its purposes are made clear. It is the physical place in which historicism connects, draws together, and disconnects events “by making them legible, significant and insignificant, or unintelligible as information” (Stoler 2009, p. 29). The repository of documents housed in the archive becomes the positive data, the events from which time, change, and contexts are charted and made visible. Where the sociologist surveys populations and the anthropologist goes into the field, the archive is the icon of historical work.
The historian is the magistrate that does the work of resurrection of the past in the present as well as the making of memory and forgetting through the archive (Steedman 2002). The archive serves as an external device (like museums and statues) through which memory/forgetting is constructed. Through registers, ledgers, and letters, the archive orders the past as a remembrance in the present. The sum of all texts becomes what a culture keeps to attest to its own past and as evidence of a continuing identity, a record and preservation of what is remembered and what is to be forgotten.

The archive becomes the romantic space of this historical “self.” The archive is the magic site where the dust and smell of the old book serves as the mesmerized past to incite the historian’s imagination. The dreams of the historian are, as Michelet said, to represent the past in “pacifying the spirits of the dead, exercising them...by finding the meaning of their brief existences” (in Steedman 2002, p. 71). When Michelet described his experience in the “catacombs of manuscripts” in the Paris Archives Nationales, he wrote about “restoring the papers and parchments to the light of day by breathing in their dust” (cited in Steedman 2002, p. 27). The use of the word dust, which is very much part of the romanticism of modern historians’ imagination of the archive, was not just a figure of speech. It was a literal description of a physiological process. The inhalation of dust in the archive was not just metaphorical. The leather skins for the book bindings in the archive harbored anthrax.

The historicist faith in the archival text as the naturalized space is ironically ahistorical. The redemptive value given to the archive as the source of “truth” ignores the nineteenth-century history of the archive. German idealistic notions were placed in the archive to claim that history was as scientific as the positivist knowledge of science and thus should be considered as equally important. This idealistic notion of history traveled into the developing fields of historical studies in the United States. In the translation into American historiography, the idealism was given an instrumentalism that was different from its European counterparts (Herbst 1965).

The making of the archive animates political energies and expertise, pulling on some social facts and converting them into qualified knowledge and ways of knowing (Stoler 2009, p. 22). The archive was the late eighteenth-century invention associated with the governing of the state (Steedman 2002). In England and France, it was a place of storage and retrieval of an aspect of written language, and the politics of that history was associated with administration: to identify the beginning of things (government, police, and magistracy) with the rule system of the law that was to govern. The positivistic facts were to create a people out of its diversity and pluralities.

This governing and administration of what constitutes history has cultural divides, which challenges the materialism given to the archive. Tröhler’s chapter identifies how different interpretive framings of texts in the history of education in Germany, for example, expresses the vertical tension of social exclusion that is related to the social advancement of bourgeoisie and the exclusion of the middle and lower classes; France and Switzerland frame the history of education on the horizontal level through the ideological tensions between liberals and conservatives; and in the United States, history is institutionally focused on issues of progress and the pertinence or resilience to change.

The political energy of the archive is not only in the differences of narration. The ordering and legislating of the archival categories and distinctions establish how truth is told and social division inscribed. In the colonial Dutch archives of Indonesia, for example, “The pulse of the archive” established categories of the kinds of people clustered for state scrutiny. The clusters were ways of living that congealed into problems, condensed into ontological categories about who people were and should be” and these practices racialized and rendered the political things “to be acted on by the auditing of the state as its commitment to the public good” (Stoler 2009, p. 31).

The fixation on the texts in the archive to trace the chronological social and individual structures has become what constitutes “history.” Within this imputed reality, historicism disabuses any narrative structure that is outside of its canon. Michel Foucault’s historical writings, for example, have been judged as not historical as he does not follow the historicist archival canons of charting the registers, ledgers, and letters as descriptive portals that are supposed to carry their own sets of meanings. This reduction of the archive to the historicist canon loses sight that Foucault’s approach to history is in fact a critique of these canons that inscribe the author as the origin of explanation. The reduction of all systems of reason to its historicist roots produces the inability to recognize other ways of thinking about the archives and historical narratives, something that I return to in the conclusion of this chapter.

This volume challenges the dogma of the archive, mutes its romanticism, and resists the coda that makes the historian as its magistrate. The archive, as Tröhler argues, is the place to reconstruct rather than to gather data, and thus to, for example, recognize the comparative diversity as the interrelations in the productions...
of schooling. While the volume's chapters maintain a faith in the archive, the archive as the physical place for finding the truth of the past is no longer given its sacredness. The archive is to understand the conditions that make the subject as possible to be "seen" and talked about rather than as the origin of historical narratives. The archive is not the documents through which their external relations and connections can be traced, such as how Horace Mann's writings make possible the early nineteenth-century laws which establish the common school.

This notion of the archive is, as Tröhler, and Ö, Martins, and Paz argue in this volume, the site in which thought is brought to bear in the thinking about history and not as the site to find the independent objects that establish what is true and traceable as history. The archive is the historian working on the interiority of the source; the establishing of the complex historical landscape in which the discourses present in the text are made possible as a way to think and act. As Ö, Martins, and Paz suggest, the archive is the taking of documents as monuments to a culture rather than the origin of its development and growth. The study of the artist and art education that Ö, Martins, and Paz report is deeply embedded in the analysis of documents that take the form of the archive, yet the study reshapes and fashions what composes the archive through the questions asked of the past. The study of history, they argue, is to study the conditions that make possible the internal rules and standards about what can be said, thought, made into memory, and institutionalized. Documents are treated as events to understand how the historical subjects become possible as objects of reflection and action. The documents are no longer "data" of historicism that give documents their own independence and reality apart from the interpretive modes applied. This notion of events in thinking about historical phenomena is again raised in Dussel's chapter on how to read visual cultures.

**Historicizing: The Historical Subject as the Historical Subject of Study**

The challenge of the book is the rethinking/revisioning of history and the emptying of history-in-historicism. I use the word revisioning to suggest that historicizing maintains certain elements that give intelligibility to historicism, such as modern consciousness and the homeless mind discussed earlier. It does so, however, through challenging the representations of the subject as the origin of historical phenomena and problematizing the relations of space and time.

The discussion in this section first focuses on historicizing as the interrogation of the historical conditions that make possible "seeing" the transcendent subject in historical narratives. Second, the methodological notion of event that I described above is explored. Event is a methodological (and epistemological) strategy. It is to take the icons and the monuments given to the origin of the school (its heroes, institutional forms, and ideation systems) to probe the uneven movements that make possible these monuments as "things" to "see" and act on as the facts and data of schooling.

**A Critical History That Decenters the Subject**

Historicizing decenters the subject (see Foucault 1971/1977; Popkewitz 1991, 1997; Popkewitz and Brennan 1998). The decentering is to engage the complex intersections that produce principles that govern what is thought, talked about, seen, and felt in the making of the subject. This decentering of the subject, with different nuances and foci, asks about how identities of subjects are produced in uneven time that have no single origin. Dussel's chapter on visual culture, for example, gives reference to how the photograph, cinema, and museum, among others, construct the social spaces and their individuality in schooling. Central in the study of visual culture is the "actor" and the archive, but their constitution as historical phenomena embody different principles than those of historicism. Rather than the human actor who observes and then acts, Dussel argues that visual cultures produce the spectator who observes "others" at a distance, such as the enabling of the "bourgeois citizen" and the middle classes to commiserate with the tragedies of the poor; and to empathize, denounce, or sentimentalize through the images produced. The photograph, movie, and art as distinct categories in social life, among other objects of the past, are studied to understand how images are made possible to "see" as lived experiences.

Dussel further revisions the notion of the archive from its realism. She argues that the history of education often treats the photograph as a means to understand what was "real" in schooling. In contrast, Dussel argues that the visual entails the construction of the social as visual elements enter into relationships and circulate with contexts and audiences. The archive, in a sense, becomes a verb and not a noun. It is to relate the complex iconic productions that combine available technologies, visual languages or genres, and contexts of production and receptions. Photographs, school museum exhibitions,
school displays, textbooks, cinema, and world exhibitions, for example, are viewed as interconnected in the production of space, epistemologies, and subjectivities in the educational field.

The decentering of the subject to understand how the subject is produced is central to the chapter by Ó. Martins, and Paz. They explore diverse discursive practices in the emergence of the notion of genius and inventiveness that makes possible the subject of the artist and artistic education. They argue that different discursive practices emerge in the long nineteenth century to classify, differentiate, and divide human subjects. The distinctions of “genius” and inventiveness are such distinctions that produce kinds of people at the intersection of art, schooling, and the social and educational sciences in Portugal. Through intensive archival analysis, a grid of practices is made visible to understand the possibility to “see” particular kinds of social actors (artists and children with artistic talents as different from others). The kinds of people who are given as geniuses, creative, and inventive embody particular cultural theses about modes of life, its principles of “freedom,” and a comparative mode of thought to differentiate and divide.

History is to locate the icons of the past as given monuments; monuments that require exploring their rules of formation and enunciations. The focus on art education in Mexico in Lora's chapter examines the early decades of the twentieth century where art education was introduced into the school in the production of memories, traditions, stories, customs, loyalties, and shared destinies. The school subject of art gave shape and fashioned a Mexican identity tied to the new state. The pedagogical project in primary school, Lora argues, was to achieve a homogeneous model of Mexicanness from its diversity. Muralism, Mexican landscape themes, and costumbrismo-derived paintings as well as portraits of Indios were for spiritual regeneration. That spiritual regeneration was directed to the poor. It was to attest to cultural and racial aspiration that was no longer the European “whitening” modeled but a dark-brown image of the ethnic and cultural diversity of peasants, workers, native Indios, Mestizos, and Mulattos. The pedagogical practices were assembled and connected with the Soviet Cultural Revolution’s artistic movements, the Belgian educador Decroly, the Americans’ Kilpatrick’s project method, and Dewey’s pragmatism in the constellations of Mexican painters, sculptors, graphic designers, players, and dancers. This traveling library (Popkewitz 2005) of aesthetic and scientific practices was connected in particular ways to form the objects and subjects of Mexican education that was not merely a sum of its parts but something different.

Lora’s and Ó. Martins, and Paz’s chapters provide a way to explore the politics of school subjects that is rarely explored in the history of schooling. The school subjects become historical events to consider the intersection of multiple social and cultural practices that enter into the didactics of schooling and the psychologies of the child and learning. While there are studies of the school subjects (see, e.g., Popkewitz 1987) related to the field of curriculum studies in the United States and Britain, these studies have tended to be ignored in the history of education. But as these chapters make evident, the formation of the school subjects is not merely the transmission of a content. They are governing practices in making human kind through ordering, classifying, and dividing practices about who the child is and should be.

If the chapters about the invention of the “artist,” the study of visual cultures, and the making of the Mexican citizen through the aesthetization of art education are exemplars, historicizing treats the autonomous author as a variable and complex function that requires historically considering the interiority of texts. It is to textually explore the enunciation of statements as embodying particular historically produced solutions and plans for action (see, e.g., Popkewitz 2005). Sobe in this volume, for example, argues that to understand the intercultural exchanges embedded in Dewey’s “travels” is to historicize the tanglements or grid of disparate actors, devices, discourses, and practices assembled and connected in nonregular and uneven depths and principles of differentiation. Horlacher, as well, questions the notion of the authorial figure as the origin of explanation when examining Pestalozzi’s educational writings as they travel into different European contexts after American Independence and the French Revolution. Where Pestalozzi is often considered as a particular standard in the organization of pedagogy, Horlacher vividly and comparatively explores how Pestalozzi schools were continually anchored through particular networks of ideas, organizations, and pedagogical arrangements. These networks were concerned with integrating people and creating collective belonging in the new nation-building processes in the early nineteenth century. Burke and Grosvenor’s chapter also challenges the notion of the authorial figure often given in biographical history. They focus on a particular British school architect in the 1800s to consider the movements of ideas, translations, and disciplining of the body that performs in the writing and reading of a life.

The decentering of the subject, however, should not be seen as doing away with enlightenment commitments to reason and rationality or
with the possibilities of agency and change. Just the opposite! It is to recognize, first, that what has come to be taken as natural and "logical" as the reason and loci of social change is itself a particular historical logic, rationality, and effect of power. Second, the inscription of the actor as the ahistorical subject conserves the very framework of its contemporaneity to substitute activity and motion in studies of change.

Making the subjects of historicism as the subject matter of history is a critical history. Critical in that there is the refusal to take the subject as transcendent and thus outside of history. History is the search to locate the emergence of the subject as a system of which governs what is possible to say, think, and do. The problematizing of what is taken as natural and outside of "time" is to make fragile the causality of the present and the possibilities of alternatives that are outside of the existing inscriptions of the past that govern the future. Its strategy to think about change is different from those embodied in historicism. Agency is in depriving the self of the reassuring stability of life and nature and to challenge the assumption that liberty and freedom are dependent on the calculation and administration of the subject.

**Historical Studies of Events**

The notion of the archive in what I have been describing as historicizing is not the "thing" from which history is told but of the play of influences in which to account for the emergence of what is seen and acted on. If I pursue the distinctions between historicism and historicizing as styles of reason, where historicism looks at the documents of the archive as the positive facts through which to trace the activities and motion of the autonomous subject, historicizing makes that giviness of the subject as an event. The notion of events is to think about what is seen and acted on as emerging as a series of accidents.

Burke and Grose's biographical history of a school architect explores this in an elegant way by focusing on what would seem to be the individual biographical subject of the nineteenth British school architect Robson. To historicize biography, they argue, is to explore the movement of intricate relations among ideas, social practices, and institutional patterns into explorations of biography as the writing and reading of a life. The tracking and tracing of life create the complexity of what constitutes the archive. It becomes the stitching of a network of pedagogical ideas, school materials with the particularities of place, and perceptions of "progress" in their circulation in Europe and North America.

In a different way of problematizing the archive, the chapters by Warde, Tröhrer, Sohe, and Horlacher explore the significance of comparative studies. Warde works in the in-between spaces of intertwined and parallel stories of educational history in Brazil and Turkey as they intersected with North American and European intellectual networks in the first decades of the twentieth century. While the term "Young Turks" was used in both settings, its emergence has different trajectories and connections in the making of "the modern school." Tröhrer explores the emergence of post-World War II international circulation of an expertise composed by networks that connect and give possibility to the paradigm of educational assessment and measurement such as found in the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). The latter is significant as it becomes influential in the constitution of a way of thinking comparatively and cross-nationally through statistics measurements in today's ranking of the national school systems. The chapters by Sohe and Horlacher, as well, maintain a comparative way of treating the subjects of history through the conditions that make those subjects historically and culturally intelligible.

If the styles of reason that travel in historicizing and historicism are thought about within trajectories related to the European Enlightenment's cosmopolitanism, a different style of historical thought is embedded in the tensions of China's modes of thought. This historical and spatial particularity is instantiated in Wu's chapter through the historical analysis of classical Chinese texts. The concern is with the tensions of Classical notions of history as they confront modern Chinese inscriptions of science in pedagogical texts. History, Wu argues, is to think about what is human through locating moral meanings in the flows and movements of relations rather than in the representations of "things" that center on the human subject which privileges the analytics of modern consciousness to order things and people. Drawing on linguistics traditions, Wu argues that classical Chinese notions of history provide subtle descriptions of actual events that enable the reservoir of meanings to be produced. History is to open and disclose that which is different from the notion of consciousness that tells or conceptualizes the analytic elements of the world as a way of access to the meaning of the past.

Education is an activity to "see" meanings out of the historical records by focusing on the texture of the records. These textures contain layers of interpretive fragments that remain open and
fluid to accommodate diversity in forming moral lessons. And at the same time, the contemporary intersections in China with the present European and North American styles of reason are not merely about the meeting of the opposites of Confucianism and Western’s rationalities of science. Wu explores how historicism brought into contemporary China violently closes up the spaces of interpretation and the subtlety of historical meanings, while being universalized as a discourse of self-consciousness.

Wu’s chapter is a comparative mode of historicizing what is taken for granted in the styles of reason discussed when only Western thought is engaged. It is thus an alternative that is both outside and in its logic. Its method for revisioning what assembled and connected in China today is simultaneous disconnected; disconnected from its prior Confucianism and also disconnected from what travels as “Western” rationalities and logic. Fendler draws attention to Wu’s discussion in the last chapter as a way to think about the shifts in historical writing that are not simply of genre. The change is one of shifts from figurative to representational language that has a profound impact on what can be assumed to be historical and the meaning of the “educated” person who understands history.

Historical Work as Styles of Reason: Reading Paradigmatically

In ordering this chapter, I focused on the styles of reason to differentiate historicism and historicizing, while recognizing differences within a style. My intention was to think pragmatically about the different intensities that order what is possible to “see” and think historically. I also sought to relate the archive as a cultural practice that entails different notions of the historical “self” who narrates the past. The reading of the past is not only about technologies or methods but also of a self that sees, think, and acts on documents in particular ways.

The seeming singularity given to the archive disappears. It is no longer a noun through which one can talk about the enclosure of historical documents. The archive is not merely the place to recoup the past but is expressive of styles of thinking and acting that are shaped in networks of social, cultural, and political practices through which the questions of history are asked and texts given as readable.

The reading of styles of reason provides a way to sort out the idea of a critical mode of thought and issues of critique. Typically, criticism is related to the internal criteria of a field, such as whether its methods are valid and rigorous. But such criteria fail as criticism because they apply their own internal rules as universal and from which to judge difference. When criteria internal to a field are applied, it produces an intellectual “fallacy” that reduces different styles of reason to differences from sameness. This was expressed earlier in the discussion of the decentering of the subject and the historicist arguments about decentering the subject as dehumanizing. A similar distinction is often made in American historicism about the “jargon” of studies that seem to be driven by theories and not by the archival presentation of data as the material evidence of the historical narrative. The jargon and theory read within the framing of styles of reason, is often not about arcane words but a language, to use the Cambridge notion, that is part of theoretical and philosophical ways of thinking and a sensitivity in studying.

I make this point to suggest that styles of reason are self-authenticating through the ways their modes of study construct their object and thus, at least at this layer of analysis, not refutable as an empirical question. If we take the argument about the inscription of the actor as the origin and its counterargument about the decentering of the subject, this is not a question of “evidence.” It is about the principles that order how judgments are made, conclusions drawn, and the fields of existence made open for scrutiny and interpretation; and thus about the limits and political of the commonsense that serves as the orthodoxy of the present.

The Ordering of the Volume

The book is ordered into four sections that do not necessarily follow the above discussion. The organization follows a logic of families of resemblances that cross and give various nuances and distinctions to the themes and arguments discussed in this chapter about historicizing.

Section I is entitled, “‘Seeing’ the Historical Object: Alternative Possibilities,” which engages in two less-visible views of ordering the subject of history of education. Dussel focuses on the visual turn to provoke thinking outside of the written texts for understanding historiography. Wu moves historically to another way of thinking about history through reflections on classical Chinese texts as moral practices that clash today with efforts to bring in Western modern notions of science.

Section II, “In Search of the Archive: Comparative Studies and Theories of Its Spaces,” provides critiques of the notion of the archive and the historian as the magistrate are engaged. The chapters offer
ways to think about the questions and narratives of history through comparative studies. With different foci and emphases, Tröhler, Sobe, and Warde, give attention to the archive not as a fixed, stable source of knowledge but as having a verb quality that pays attention to how research questions are framed, and to the intertwining, multiplicity, and relatedness of networks or grids to make intelligible historical events. Further, each chapter gives attention to the importance of comparative studies through challenging how ideas such as “transfer” and borrowing, common in educational policy studies, require sophisticated historical analyses of the social and cultural complexities that engage the particularities of time/space.

Section III, “The Monuments of the Past as the Events of History: Historicizing the Subject,” brings into focus the historicizing of particular objects/subjects that historicism has taken for granted, and in the process, helps to provide a broader and different view of the archive. Hofracher examines the travels of Pestalozzi into different places to argue that to read historically is to recognize differences that relate to cultural, social, and pedagogical practices. O. Martins, and Paz explore how the subject of the child as artist in the formation of art education embodied the dynamics of the production of distinctions and divisions related to notions of genius, status, and inventiveness in Portugal. Lora’s discussion of artistic education focuses on the making of a school subject as embodying technologies of the self and the fashioning of collective identities. Burke and Grosvenor provide a way of rethinking the notion of biography in intellectual history through examining the grid of social, cultural, and political practices that give intelligibility to the “body” of the school architect in mid-nineteenth-century England.

Section IV, “Historicizing and the Space of American Historicism,” provides a reflection about the contribution of the previous chapters: Feidler’s work intersects history and the philosophy of knowledge to think about the conditions that fashion its historiography.

Notes

1. Bloch uses the word “tracks.” Trace suggests a more ambiguous existence when brought into the present.

2. I am using the distinctions as a comparative mode and do not rule out other possibilities or degrees of differences. The distinctions are helpful, however, in pragmatically exploring reigning principles of historiography that translate into the presence given to the archive as discussed after the first section.

3. Where the Kuhnian notion of paradigm tends to be idealist and internal in its descriptions, my use of styles of reason focus on the historical conditions that make the particular principles that order and classify what is thought of history and the historical “self.” In this respect, the discussion embodies a materialism but not as a base/superstructure or a nominalist/realist argument.

4. The discussion recognizes that historicism has made important contributions, such as in the historical field of curriculum history by opening up of the study of schooling to questions of the organization and selection of its knowledge through the pioneering work of Herbert Kliebard (1986), Barry Franklin (1986), and David Hamilton (1989/2009). My concern here is, however, with the limits of historicism as a mode of reason that is embodied in these studies.

5. This does not mean that there have not been such attempts. There have been momentary breaks in historicism, such as the work of Sol Cohen (1999) and some special issues of the History of Education Quarterly published by the American History of Education Society (e.g., “Theory in Educational History,” edited by E. Tamura, C. Eick, and R. Coloma) and the annual convention program of The American Educational Research Association, Division B, (e.g., the 2011 meeting where drafts of some of the chapters in this book were initially presented). This book, then, can be viewed as part of attempts to engage the field of American historiography of education in a conversation about its “identities.”

6. For discussion of these debates, see Hamilton (1996).

7. It is interesting that by the twentieth century, reason and rationality became assumed as one category and are often given their classification as “science” in social policy, such as in current themes that purport that reforms should be determined as useful (reasonable) only if they are supported by “scientific evidence.”

8. On the invention and changes of the notions of objectivity as distinct from subjectivity, see Daston and Galison (2010).

9. Historicism, as I describe it in later sections, also embodies this general quality of consciousness, but through different principles of ordering and classifying thought itself.


11. This notion of decentering the subject has been subject to a range of discussion. Often its critiques are ordered through the principles of historicism that take for granted the actor as the source of humanism. This reduction as critique misses the substantive arguments being engaged (see Paul Veyne [1971/1998] for a discussion of history and the limits of this reductionism as critique).
References


Section I

"Seeing" the Historical Object: Alternative Possibilities